INTRODUCTION
There have been several security protocols defined by standards organizations to provide security for differing communications models. Each of these security protocols has incorporated the concept of a security association.
The IEEE Secure Data Exchange (SDE) protocol The SA-Attributes are defined as:
The coljection of information required to control the security of communications between an entity and its remote peer(s).
The I S 0 Upper Layer Security Model (ULSM) [9] defines a security association as:
A relationship between two or more entities for which there exists attributes (state information and rules) to govern the provision of security services in wlving those entities.
The ISP Security Association Management Protocol (SAMP) [5] (see section 3.2) defines a security association 
as:
We add our definition of a security association to all of the above as:
A collection of static and dynamic security relevant information required by two or more security objects that enable a user to "municate with its peer user(s) according to a security policy
While the definition of a security association provided by each of these protocols and models is different, there are several concepts that are common to all. The common ideas expressed are: (1) a relationship between entities will exist, (2) this relationship is represented by information, (3) this information is shared among the entities in the relationship, and (4) the existence of the shared information and relationship will allow the entities to communicate securely.
SECURI[TY ASSOCIATION DEPENDENT PROTOCOLS
A number of security protocols have been developed that require a security association be established in order for the protocol to transport data securely. The security association provides the protocol with the information required to execute security services and mechanisms to secure the communications. This section presents several protocols that require security associations and explains how they identify and use security association information.
IEEE 802.10 Secure Data Exchange (SDE)
The Secure Date Exchange (SDE) security protocol was developed by the Standard for Interoperable LAN/ MAN Security (SILS) working group within the IEEE 802 committee. SDE became an IEEE standard in September of 1992 [3] . SDE is a data link layer security protocol that protects against traffic flow analysis, masquerading, data modification, and unauthorized use of resources by providing the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and access control security services. The SDE security proto- The SDE protocol provides confidentiality, integrity, data origin authentication, and access control security services. Confidentiality is provided by encrypting the SDE protocol data unit (PDU), and integrity is provided by generating an Integrity Check Value (ICV) which is placed into the ICV field of the SDE PDU. Both of these SDE services rely on an extemal service (i.e., Key Management) to negotiate and establish the security attributes (e.g., encryption algorithms, cryptographic keying material, integrity algorithms, integrity keys) needed for SDE to perform these tasks. SDE also supports the data origin authentication established by the key management service with the use of a station identifier in the protected header of the SDE PDU. Access control is provided to users of SDE by the use of security associations and the SDE security label, which is also in the protected header of the SDE PDU. SDE provides the enforcement of the access control policy.
Secure Data Network Systems (SDNS)

Security Protocol 3 (SP3)
The Secure Data Networks Systems (SDNS) program was initiated in 1986 by the US. Government. It was a cooperative research p r o g m which involved several government agencies and twelve computer and communications corporations. The SDNS program designed and specified a security architecture and accompanying protocols for the next generation of secure network products for the U.S. Government. One of the SDNS protocols, Security Protocol 3 (SP3) [ 141, was designed to provide secure communications for the network layer of both the OS1 and TCP/IP communications architectures.
SP3 supports the provision of confidentiality, integrity, data origin authentication, and access control security services. Similar to IEEE SDE, confidentiality is provided by encrypting the SP3 PDU and integrity is achieved by calculating an Integrity Check Value (ICV) that is placed in the ICV field of the SP3 PDU. Data origin authentication is supplied by a combination of key management techniques and explicit protection of network addresses. Access control is perfoxmed external to SP3 by the key management entities. However, if communications is allowed and a security label is provided for the data, then SP3 will make an access control check against this label on both transmission and receipt.
The term "cryptographic association" is used in the SP3 document rather than security association, but the underlying concept is the same. SP3 relies on the services of the SDNS Key Management Protocol ( [16] , [17] ) to place the necessary information into a local Traffic Encryption Key Management Information Base (TEK MIB). The placement of cryptographic keys and key attributes by cooperating key management entities constitutes the establishment of a security association between two SP3 entities. An SP3 security association is identified by using the Key-ID field of the SP3 Clear Header as shown in Figure 2 . The Key-ID field has a variable length. SP3 entities use the SP3-Source-Address, SP3_Destination_Address, and requested attributes (e.g., confidentiality requested, integrity requested, label requested) to determine a valid security association. If a security association exists, then the Key-ID and associated attributes are returned to the SP3 entity. These attributes are used for PDU processing. If a security association does not exist, the SP3 entity discards the data received and may file an audit report, depending on the local security policy.
I S 0 Network Layer Security Protocol (NLSP)
The IS0 Network Layer Security Protocol (NLSP) effort began in late 1989. The contributing protocols were (1) SDNS Security Protocol 3 (discussed above), (2) Endto-End Security Protocol (EESP), and (3) Security Protocol for X.25 (SPX). NLSP became an IS0 standard, known as International Standard (IS) 11577, in 1994 [7] . NLSP was designed to provide network layer security for both connection oriented and connectionless networks. This difference in network topology has an impact on the use of security associations within NLSP. NLSP for connectionless networks, or NLSP-CL, supports the provision of connectionless confidentiality, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, access control, and traffic flow confidentiality. NLSP for connec-tion oriented networks, or NLSP-CO, supports the provision of connection confidentiality, connection integrity without recovery, peer entity authentication, access control, and traffic flow confidentiality.
Both NLSP-CO and NLSP-CL provide confidentiality using encipherment, access control using security labels and control of ke s, integrity using Integrity Check Values (ICVs), and d c flow confidentiality using traffic padding and address hiding within the protected header of the NLSP PDU. NLSPCL provides data origin authentication through the use of ICVs in conjunction with key management, while NLSP-CO provides peer entity authentication using enciphered integrity sequence numbers in conjunction with key management.
NLSP requires a security association be in place before connections can be established or connectionless PDUs can be transmitted. There are three sets of information required for the existence of an SA within NLSP. The first set of policy related information is called an Agreed Set of Security Rules (ASSR) and is established prior to communication through registration. The second set of information can be established using in-band methods with either the Security Association (SA) PDU or the Secure Data Transfer (SDT) PDU. An SA can also be established using out-of-band methods such as OS1 management. The SA-PDU is used if information exchanged during SA establishment does not need to be protected and the SDT-PDU is used if the information must be protected. The third set of information is established and updated as part of the operation of NLSP.
When two NLSP entities do not have a security association existing between them, they may establish one by using a Security Association Management Protocol (SAMP). The NLSP standard does not mandate a specific SAMP, but does provide an example of a SAMP that meets the requirements of the standard. This SAMP, known as Security Association Protocol (SA-P), for NLSP is discussed in section 3.3.
I S 0 Transport Layer Security Protocol
(TLSP) Similar to the IS0 NLSP, the IS0 Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLSP) [8] effort began in late 1989. There was only one protocol contributed for standardization. This protocol was the Security Protocol 4 (SP4) [15] developed within the SDNS program to provide security for the transport layer of the OS1 communications architecture. SP4 was designed to provide security for both connection oriented and connectionless transport services and, therefore, TLSP provides these same functions.
TLSP provides the same services for connection oriented and connectionless transport services as NLSP does for network services, except W c flow confidentiality which TLSP does not provide. Additionally, TLSP provides connection integrity with recovery. TLSP also allows a key to be shared between several connections and this differs from NLSP.
Because TLSP and NLSP were being standardized in parallel the requirements for security associations for TLSP are identical to those for NLSP. TLSP also describes the use of a Security Association Management Protocol (SAMP) and defines the same S A M P as NLSP, which is discussed in section 3.3.
SECURITY ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
Section 2 described currently defined security protocols requiring security associations. The proliferation of these security protocols has lead to the requirement for a protocol that establishes the security associations. A Security Association Management Protocol (SAMP) negotiates the security services, mechanisms, and information that will represent a security association. The SAMP also provides the capability to generate new security associations, and modify or delete existing security associations. This section presents several protocols that provide the required S A M P capabilities. [4] . KMP was originally designed to generate cryptographic material and security associations for SDE. Since KMP resides in the application layer, KMP can establish security associations for any security protocol (e.g., SDE, NLSP). The KMP model follows the guidelines defined in the IS0 standard for the structure of the application layer [6] and is illustrated in Figure 3 . 
I
Figure 3 KMP Model
KMP is comprised of two application service objects. One for peer-to-peer key generation (i.e., KPASO) and one for key generation between the peer and the key management center (i.e., KCASO). KMP incorporates the services of the Association Control Service Element (ACSE) and the Security Exchange Service Element (SESE) [ 1 I] from the Generic Uppr Layers Security (GULS) [lo] standard. The ACSE establishes the application association (i.e., an application Connection) between two peers or between an entity and the key center. The SESE is used to transport the security information between two peers or between an entity and the key center. Due to the use of ACSE and SESE and their PDUs, KMP does not have unique PDUs and only needs to provide service definitions.
KMP supports both symmetric and asymmetric keying techniques and supports three types of key distribution: manual based, center based, and certificate based. In addition, KMP provides cryptographic material and security associations for multicast groups. In all cases, a key is generated first, then that key is used to protect the negotiation and establishment of the security association. This process is illustrated in Figure 4. In summary, KMP has tightly coupled the cryptographic keying material with the security association establishment process. The reasoning behind this is that both are always needed and the negotiation of the security attributes must always be protected by a keyed mechanism.
Establish
Security Association Capabilities
KMP is used to create, spawn, and delete security associations. The create service initiates the key generation process. This can include an optional exchange between the two peels in which key information (e.g., key generation algorithm, key distribution method, authentication technique) is negotiated and agreed upon. Whether or not the initial option exchange takes place, the key is generated using either negotiated key information or key information obtained from the SMIB. The SAID is generated during the key generation process. The key is then used to protect the negotiation of security attributes. The protection is provided by the GULS protected syntax with the sealed and enciphered security transformations using the key that was generated.
The Spawn service allows a previously established security association to be used as a template for a new security association. This will eliminate the need for the optional key information exchange and allows the choice of generating new cryptographic keying material or transforming the existing cryptographic keying material. The Spawn service has five options: (1) transform keying material, (2) update attributes, (3) transform keying material and update attributes, (4) generate new keying material, and (5) generate new keying material and update attributes. The establishment and optional attribute negotiation of the new security association is protected by the previously established security association, which remains unaffected and the new security association is assigned a unique SAID.
The Delete service is used to notify the peer entity that the security association is no longer needed or has expired. This is an unconfirmed service.
Even though named as a key management protocol, the E E E KMP is a S A M P that does not dictate how cryptographic keying material is generated, but does require that security association establishment be protected. In order to provide this protection, KMP generates cryptographic keying material.
ISP Security Association Management
Protocol (SAMP)
Introduction
The Security Association Management Protocol (SAMP) was developed by the U.S. Department of Defense ISDN Security Program (ISP). The ISP S A M P [5] was designed to establish security associations between entities of all types including computing devices, telephony equipment, in-line encryptors and multifunctional equipment providing any combination of these capabilities. The ISP SAMP specification provides a service interface for the entity requiring security associations and describes the syntax definitions of the security information exchanged between communicating entities.
Security Association Capabilities
The ISP SAMP specifies a two-step procedure for creating a security association. First, a basic security relationship is created between entities requiring secure communications. This basic security relationship, called a security context, allows multifunctional entities to establish a minimum set of security information. During the second step the security context protects the establishment of a complete set of security information for a specific type of communications. This complete set of security information is the security association. This process is illustrated in Figure 5 . The security association and the security context can be the same, The security context can also be used to protect the negotiation of a security association with a higher level of protection than the security context. For example, a security context can require that all communications use mechanisms that provide a certain level of protection (e.g., CONFIDENTIAL.). A security association can be created under protection of this security context that requires all communications to use mechanisms that provide a higher level of protection (e.g., SECRET). Any number of security associations can be negotiated and established under the protection of a security context. ISP S A M P services are the initiation, negotiation, establishment, and release of a security context; the negotiation, creation, modification, and deletion of security associations; and optional security object management services. The security object management services were included to easily satisfy the need for object management without having to create another protocol or become overburdened with network management responsibilities.
The ISP SAMP defines the concept of a Security Association Type (SAT) to control the exchange of security information for the negotiation and establishment of security contexts and associations. A SAT is a set of rules describing how to use the protocol services to exchange security information. The SAMP can be thought of as a command interpreter, similar to C shell. A SAT is functionally similar to a script file, providing the S A M P with the execution order of its services. A SAT may also contain the security information, including all security options to be negotiated and the security attribute syntax. The SAT provides the ISP SAMP protocol machine with the semantics for its operation and the syntax for the security data exchanged. A SAT is defined using Abstract Syntax Notation l (ASN.l). SATs are currently being defined that will provide the S A M P with the direction required to establish secure voice, secure video and secure data associations. 
The SA-P is used to perform security association establishment and release. Prior to establishing a security association the SA-P requires a list of the ASSRs supported along with the security services supported for each ASSR, an asymmetric key pair for each entity, a certificate from a trusted authority, and the public keys of any trusted certification authorities that are involved with the SA establishment and management.
The SA-P initiates a key token exchange to generate a shared secret. The NLSP and TLSP entities use this shared secret in conjunction with a private key algorithm to encipher the remainder of the communication between
IS0 Security Association Protocol (SAP)
them. An example of this mechanism is the Diffie Hellman exchange and a detailed description is included in [7] and [SI. Certificates and digital signatures created by the key token exchange ; We used for authentication. Upon completion of the authentication, protocol exchanges are used to negotiate SA attributes. The communicating NLSP/TzSP peer entities then engage in attribute negotiation to establish the security services and mechanisms they will support. This is done based on the supported ASS& and their associated security services.
TECHNICAL ISSUES
The future is predicted to be a global computing and communications environment. It is expected that people will be using computing and communications devices everywhere and accessing resources, databases and services easily, quickly, and securely. A S A M P is one way to establish the information required to secure communications in this global environment. However, there are several technical issues surrounding the use of protocols that depend on security associations and their management. This section briefly explains some of the issues surrounding security associations and SAMPs.
Standardization
Realizing global secure interoperability will require a standard method of defining and exchanging security information. An open standard protocol, providing the SAMP concepts discussed in this paper will be required for secure communications in the future.
Protocol Independence
A SAMP should have modular functionality and not be interwoven with a key management protocol or a network management protocol. In order for a S A M P to efficiently provide al security association service it must not be encumbered with the overhead of other protocols which may or may not be required for a particular application. Single functionality protocols promote the composing of open communications environments and the upgrading of protocols in a straightforward manner.
Flexibility and Extensibility
A SAMP must be capable of negotiating all services that might be required to secure communications. It should also be flexible enough to handle additional, possibly unspecified, secunity services. While flexibility and extensibility are necessary to accommodate changes in technology, there is a penalty in the amount of added complexity.
Providing flexibility and extensibility in a S A M P must not increase complexity to the point of severely degrading performance or causing excessive operational requirements.
Security Information Independence
A standard method of defining security information that is independent of the S A M P rransporting it will be required if global secure interoperability is to be achieved. To facilitate interoperability, common groups of security information can be bundled together and assigned an identifier. A regisnation authority would be required to assign identifiers and to manage these identifiers to ensure consistent use and definitions. The identification of a registration authority is an issue not addressed in this paper.
Communications Environment Independence
A S A M P must be independent of the communications applications (voice, data, video, etc.) that request its services. It must also be independent of the communications media (terrestrial, wireless, etc.) transporting it. To the greatest extent possible, it must be independent of the surrounding protocol environment. This communications environment independence will allow the SAMP to support multiple systems without extensive upgrades.
Security Association Awareness ,
Future protocols and applications must be designed with the concept of security associations in mind. Network management applications and protocols, security management applications and protocols, and all applications that rely on or facilitate communications must be aware of and require security associations.
Security association aware protocols already exist. Explanations of some of these protocols are given in sec- 
RESEARCH EFFORTS
An effort has been initiated to introduce the Security Association concept into the Intemet protocol architecture. The protocol being developed is called the Intemet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 1131. ISis a protocol composed of four components. These components support a variety of cryptographic techniques and mechanisms. The four components of ISAKMP can be applied in various combinations to provide security services according to a stated requirement. This coalition is designed to provide maximum flexibility, while providing the requisite security. The four components of the ISAKMP are an authentication exchange, an anticlogging token exchange (ACTE) similar to the work presented in [12], a Security Association Management Protocol, and a public key exchange.
The authentication component rovides the ability to parties. Different signature algorithms, such as RSA and DSS, are supported along with differing certificate formats, including X.509 and PGP certificates.
The public key exchange establishes a session key for communications using conventional encryption. A variety of key exchanges can be supported by this protocol. Some examples are Diffie-Hell", the enhanced Diffie-Hellman key exchange described in [l] , and the RSA-based exchange certificates which ident' 2 y the communicating key exchange used by PGP. This component will also support key escrow, but does not mandate its use.
The ACTE uses tokens composed of secret random data to allow an entity involved in the communications to verify that the received message is from the responding entity with which it thinks it is communicating. The ACTE is aimed at protecting the computing resources Erom attack without spending excessive CPU resources to determine its authenticity. This ACTE exchange prior to CPU-intensive public key operations can thwart some denial of serviceattempts. ~
The SAMP component of ISAKMP provides the abdity to establish (inciuding negotiate), mbdify, and delete Security Associations and their attributes. The S A M P component is comprised of four services which are SA Negotiation, SA Commit, SA Modify, and SA Delete. The exchange of possible security attributes and the indication of which attributes are selected for SA establishment is part of the SA Negotiation service. The SA Commit service allows the entity initiating the SA establishment to confirm that it agrees to and locally established the SA. The SA Modify service provides the ability to exchange specific security attributes to be modified within an existing SA. The SA Delete service is informational, letting the receiving entity know that the initiating entity has deleted an SA and will reject data with the indicate SAID.
The four ISAKMP components can be exchanged in different orders. The components may also be concatenated, allowing the number of exchanges to vary from four, no concatenation, to one, total concatenation. An ordering of ISAKMP components to create a specific protocol exchange is called a scenario. The scenarios highlight the positive aspect of having four protocol components whose order of exchange is flexible. Each scenario provides a different type of protection and security attribute negotiation and each is suitable for a different situation.
As an example, a scenario that begins with the authentication component provides confirmation of who the communicating entities are immediately. This does require that both entities are able to parse each others certificates, since certificate type cannot be negotiated. An opposite scenario would have the authentication component last, in its own exchange. This allows the certificates to be encrypted before being exchanged, which protects the user identity from passive eavesdroppers on the network. In this scenario however, you cannot confirm exactly which user you are communicating with until the vary last exchange, which maybe after a computationally intensive public key generation. A final example of a scenario is to perform the SAMP component in the first ISAKMP exchange. This allows all security attributes, including certificate type, signature algorithm, key exchange, and encryption algorithm to be negotiated. Thls scenario takes maximum advantage of the other components flexibility. Entities who have never communicated before, as happens when web surfing, can establish an SA. The SA establishment is unprotected and should be reconfirmed once the SA is established.
A software prototype based on the Intemet Draft [ 131 is being developed to test and evolve the SA concepts defined in this section.
